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There has been a recent resurgence of interest in the subject of rhetoric, including within 
economics. The purpose of the paper is to focus on the ideas on rhetoric of Adam Smith 
and his contemporaries (particularly Hume) in relation to their philosophy and 
economics, against the background of the Scottish Enlightenment. Discussions of 
language in Scotland at that time departed from what had become a conventional 
emphasis either on persuasion or on style in order to focus on a broader notion of 
communication which encompassed both. This followed from a focus on language 
differences within a united Britain. But for Smith it also followed from his moral 
philosophy, whereby communication was important as a vehicle for persuasion in the 
absence of scope for argument by demonstrable proof. He was thus concerned to set up a 
system of rhetoric. Smith distinguished between thederivation of (provisional) 
knowledge by the Newtonian experimental method, andthe communication of that 
knowledge as if it were based on derivation from first principles. Subsequent 
(mis)interpretation of Smith’s economics can be understood as stemming from mistaking 
the rhetoric for the method, and interpreting first principles as axioms. A fuller 
understanding of Smith’s views on communication andthe role of sympathy (through 
imagination) might have led to different understandings of Smith’s economics prevailing. 
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The purpose of this paper is to consider the ideas about communication which evolved in 
Scotland in the eighteenth century, and which still have importance today with the revival 
of interest in the field. The study of rhetoric has a long history, going back to ancient 
Greece. In the pre-enlightenment period, rhetorical study had come to focus on literary 
criticism.2 However, the eighteenth-century ideas on rhetoric in Britain reflected the 
growth in natural science and the associated preferenc  for a plainer style.3 These ideas 
were developed in Scotland in a distinctive systemaic way in being concerned, both with 
linguistic style from a literary perspective, and with metaphysics, or knowledge about the 
real world. The resulting synthetic approach to rhetoric was captured, not only in the 
content, but also in the title, of Adam Smith’s (1762-63a) lectures on the subject: 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. The aim here is to explore the system of rhetoric 
put forward by Smith, and to use Smith’s own ideas on rhetoric in order to understand his 
economics and the way in which it has been interpreted. Because Smith was concerned 
with communication, both linguistic style and form of reasoning played a part in 
capturing the imagination of the audience.  
 We will discuss how, because the scientific method itself might differ from the 
most persuasive way of communicating ideas, the scope f r misinterpretation was 
enhanced. Since scientific method and rhetoric differed for Smith himself, we can 
understand why Smith could be understood as the fatr of political economy (including 
its Austrian and Marxist forms) on the basis of hisscientific method, and of general 
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equilibrium theory on the basis of his rhetoric. We will consider these general 
interpretations of his economics in more detail below.  
 The broader Scottish enlightenment understanding of rhetoric as communication 
is something which has emerged in much of the modern lit rature on rhetoric. This is 
particularly the case in the context of economics, in the work of McCloskey (1985, 
1994).4  McCloskey traces ideas on communication from classic l times, and explores 
Smith’s ideas on rhetoric as expressed in his Lectures on Jurisprudence (Smith 1762-
63b), the Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith 1759) and the Wealth of Nations (Smith 
1776), rather than the Lectures on Rhetoric themselves, illustrating how embedded 
Smith’s ideas on rhetoric were in his theory of knowledge and indeed of human nature, 
more generally. Others have applied the theory of rhetoric to Smith’s own writing. For 
example Warren Samuels has applied his rhetoric appro ch (Samuels 1989: Introduction) 
to an exploration of the different interpretations of Smith himself (Samuels 2009), while 
Vivienne Brown (1994) compares the rhetoric of the T ory of Moral Sentiments with 
that of the Wealth of Nations. 
 The approach to be taken here to presenting Smith’s ideas will likewise emphasise 
the interconnections between different aspects of his oeuvre, drawing on aspects of his 
context and apparent intentions, but drawing explicitly on the Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres. Indeed one of Smith’s ideas on rhetoric was that, to understand a speaker 
or author, it is necessary to understand the spirit in which their ideas are being put 
forward. Here in this notion of an outside observer s eking to understand an author, with 
sympathy, we seem to have presentiment of the concept of the impartial spectator which 
he developed in the Theory of Moral Sentiments (something we will come back to 
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below). Further, this historiographical approach, developed in modern times by Quentin 
Skinner (1969), facilitates our study of interconnections by seeing some continuity in an 
author’s thought. But it puts a focus on the author which is challenged by another 
influential stream within modern rhetorical study. Particularly important for our 
consideration of Smith is Brown’s (1994) thoughtful reading of Smith which emphasises 
understanding from the point of view of the reader rather than the author. However, as we 
proceed, we will discuss how Smith addresses issues of understanding among his 
audiences which allows discussion of different readings.5 
Smith’s mentor and friend, David Hume, also emphasised the role of rhetoric. He 
refers to ‘contentment’ with the outcome of enquiry, rather than “truth”, and therefore his 
role in persuading his readers. “There is nothing which is not the subject of debate, and in 
which men of learning are not of contrary opinions. … amidst all this bustle ‘tis not 
reason, which carries the prize, but eloquence” (Hume 1739-40: xiv). But it was Smith 
who developed his thoughts on rhetoric more fully, thoughts which were recorded in the 
form of notes taken of his lectures in Edinburgh, and later in Glasgow, in the form of the 
Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres.  
The intellectual context for Smith and Hume was theenlightenment. This 
development occurred during a time of dramatic change i  Scotland, as in the rest of 
Europe. Agricultural improvement and the beginnings of specialised factory production 
were increasing wealth and encouraging shifts of population into the cities. This 
experience raised questions for the newly-emerging social sciences - about how this new 
system would work economically, socially and morally (Young 1997). To these were 
added the practical questions for what were called th  natural sciences. The result was an 
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intellectual ferment. This was compounded in Scotland by political change. The Union of 
Parliaments in 1707 had shifted the political centr to London, while the 1715 and 1745 
Jacobite Rebellions had a profound effect on Scottish society. These were armed 
rebellions aimed at restoring the Stuart line to the British throne, with most (but not all) 
support from the Scottish Highlands, whose culture was then actively suppressed when 
the second rebellion failed. The Scottish Enlightenm t thinkers were keen to make their 
contribution within a British context. Yet, on account of their experience within Scotland 
(and in Scotland within Britain), they were aware of issues of difference in culture and 
language in a way which their contemporaries elsewhere were not (Emerson 2008, Dow 
and Dow, 2008).   
Communication was central to all of this. New ideas were being developed, but 
had to be communicated successfully at a time when t  relevant disciplines had not been 
fully established. The Scottish thinkers were acutely aware of communication problems 
at a variety of levels (Berry 1974; Howell 1975). The Select Society in Edinburgh, of 
which Smith and Hume were members, took on the task of promoting southern English 
as the common language (Buchan 2003, 128-30). Smith and Hume’s mentor, Frances 
Hutcheson, was the first in Scotland to lecture in English rather than Latin (Berry 1974). 
English was not the first language of Scotland. Most Scots in the Highlands and Islands 
had been Gaelic speakers, but that language was now banned after the Rebellions. 
Elsewhere in Scotland the first language was Scots, which could not be readily 
understood outside Scotland. Smith and Hume travelled widely on the Continent, and 
strove to speak in a form of English which could be better understood, both there and in 
England. It was an active matter for debate, how best to speak and write in English. 
 5 
But it was not just a matter of successful translation from one language to another 
(the conduit metaphor of communication). Communication of ideas also involved 
persuasion with respect to particular understandings of reality. The enlightenment saw its 
key figures thinking about problems in a totally new way, and this had to be 
communicated persuasively if others were to follow. But in addition, in Scotland, there 
was an acceptance that true knowledge was unattainable. What was to be communicated, 
then, was not “truth”, but a way of thinking about the world which made sense in terms 
of the listener’s experience, and which provided soluti ns to pressing problems. The 
listener had to be persuaded to accept the speaker’s judgment, even at the level of 
conceptualisation. Communication issues were therefore integral to the theory of 
knowledge. 
In the next section we will explore further the theory of knowledge in the Scottish 
enlightenment, contrasting it with theories of knowledge elsewhere. We will see the 
relevance of the ideas on rhetoric which arose from this background when we apply them 
to Adam Smith himself in the interpretation of his economic writings. In particular, we 
will see the rhetorical force of the modern interprtation of him as a free-marketeer. This 
is not just a matter of antiquarian interest. The power of this interpretation has meant that 
many of Smith’s ideas which do not fit into a general equilibrium framework, such as the 
importance of history, of social convention, of arts, of moral philosophy and indeed about 
methodology itself, have been lost to modern economics discourse.6 We will see how 
different interpretations of Smith’s use of rhetoric led to different interpretations of his 
economics. What Smith actually communicated, over th  ages, was arguably not what he 
intended (but he would, at least in retrospect, have understood). 
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Scottish Moral Philosophy 
The enlightenment period in Europe is generally characterised as the Age of Reason. 
Rather than truth being the sole preserve of the Church - the product of revelation - 
science would establish truth by means of human reason. Influenced by René Descartes, 
the French enlightenment is most closely associated with the privileging of reason. The 
implication was that the real world could be explained by means of introspection and 
deductive logic. More important, reason could be usd to justify actively changing the 
world; this period saw the rise of humanism. David Hume grappled with this approach, 
but eventually concluded that it was not an adequate b sis for science. In particular, he 
concluded that reason could not prove existence, without which science could not begin. 
However, social convention, built up over centuries of experience, provided the basis for 
belief in existence. Here we have the beginnings of the Scottish theory of human nature, 
on which all other knowledge, according to Hume, should be built (see further Dow 
2001). What was being put forward was a form of logic which was neither purely 
inductive nor deductive, but which employed a pluralist approach to knowledge, as in 
Keynes’s subsequent formulation of ‘human logic’ (see Gerrard 1992).7 
 Indeed a theory of human nature was needed to understand why we seek 
knowledge in the first place.8 Hume and Smith both emphasised sentiment (including 
moral sentiment, or passion) as the starting point for actions beyond instinct, and for 
knowledge. Reason came later. They discussed the sense of awe and wonder we 
experience when we come across something new which we cannot explain (see Smith 
1795). This was the focus of Smith’s (posthumously published) essay on the History of 
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Astronomy (Smith 1795; see further Skinner 1976). This sense of awe and wonder drives 
us to seek out explanations. The very idea of causal connection itself comes from our 
own experience; we become accustomed to one thing following another, such as pain 
whenever we hit our hand, which encourages the idea of cause itself, in that one might 
cause the other:  
It follows, then, that all reasonings concerning cause and effect, are 
founded on experience, and that all reasonings from experience are 
founded on the supposition, that the course of nature will continue 
uniformly the same. We conclude, that like causes, in like circumstances, 
will always produce like effects.  
(Hume 1739-40: 651) 
But Hume and Smith argued that the real world is so complex, and the mechanisms so 
hidden, that we cannot hope to understand fully what t ese causal mechanisms are. We 
are driven psychologically, as we would say now, to seek explanations which accord as 
well as possible with our experience and conventional u derstandings. But it is in effect 
the human condition that we cannot reasonably expect to uncover truth.  
Having been motivated to find an explanation, the pr ferred approach was the 
Newtonian experimental method, as this was understood in Scotland (see Comim 2006; 
Montes 2006).9 Experiments as we now understand them were possible only in the 
physical sciences; in the social sciences it was history which provided the experimental 
evidence. Both Hume and Smith made detailed study of a wide range of historical 
episodes in a wide variety of locations. From this study they derived provisional 
principles, which would then be confronted with some other example of experience to see 
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if it fitted.10 If so, the principle was confirmed. If not, the principle required modification. 
Modifications would be expected for application to different circumstances. This was 
very different from Descartes’s logical deduction from axioms taken to be true, such as 
his famous “cogito ergo sum”. One line of reasoning was derived from experience and 
was subject to modification in different contexts, while the other was derived from self-
evident truths and had universal application. The philosophy of science was 
fundamentally different. Further, while Descartes rlied only on introspection and reason, 
Smith emphasised other faculties too (see further Dow 2009). 
A critical human faculty which assists the process of the formation of theories is 
the imagination. As Griswold (2006: 23) argues, “Smith presents the imagination as lying 
at the heart of both ‘sympathy’ and of intellectual endeavour”. The imagination furnished 
the conjectures which filled in the gaps in the evid nce, as well as the theoretical system 
in which those conjectures were formed. In communicating such theoretical systems, it 
was not surprising in such an age that Smith should ta k about theories as being 
“imaginary machines”. Theories appeal to our experience, but also to our imaginations, 
by providing simple explanations to ease our sense of wonder, and explanations which 
are aesthetically appealing (Comim 2006). The invisble hand is an example of metaphor 
which allows us to understand Smith’s notion of a system whereby the unintended 
consequences of individual actions may produce a beneficial outcome. 
The imagination is also exercised through one of its products: sympathy (Smith 
1759; see also Raphael 1985). While sympathy is fundamental to social behaviour in 
Scottish enlightenment thought (and indeed to the notio  of identity; see Davis, 2003), it 
is also important for the mutual relations between author and reader, between speaker and 
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audience. Successful communication requires that the writer or speaker attempts to see 
the matter from the perspective of the reader or audience. As Robert Burns (1786) put it: 
“O wad some Power the giftie gie us, To see oursels as ithers see us!”.11 How to 
communicate ideas in a persuasive manner is the subj ct of rhetoric, where imagination 
plays a central role. Let us turn now to focus on Smith’s ideas on rhetoric. 
 
Smith’s Rhetoric 
Adam Smith’s first employment, following attendance at Glasgow University and then 
Oxford University (where he no doubt improved his command of English), was to offer a 
series of private lectures in rhetoric in Edinburgh in 1748-9 which, unusually for that 
time, were delivered in English. Smith was to continue to give these lectures when he 
took up the Chair in Logic and Rhetoric, and again as Professor of Moral Philosophy, in 
Glasgow. The London Times (1790) obituary referred to Smith’s “pronunciation a d 
style”, which were “much superior to what could, at that time, be acquired in Scotland 
only”. At a time when Scottish thinkers were anxious to play on a wider stage, a 
discussion of language and presentation by someone recognised for his language skills 
attracted a ready audience. 
Indeed much of Smith’s lectures concerned linguistic tyle and how best to 
communicate clearly (Skinner 1996; Howell 1975). For example, he argued for a plain 
style, avoiding elaborate figures of speech. While the plain style would reduce the scope 
for stirring the imagination and thus sympathy by st le itself, it opened up scope for 
engaging sympathy through such devices as metaphors and references to telling episodes 
(such as the pin factory example with which he opens the Wealth of Nations).12 Smith 
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also argued against a scholastic style, recounting all aspects of a subject. Further, when 
trying to convey others’ ideas, Smith regarded it as important to try to bring alive the 
spirit of the author. This enlivens our imaginations such that a sympathetic bond is built 
up between author and reader, between speaker and audience, which aids communication. 
Thus James Boswell (1785), the diarist, gives us an example based on his attendance at 
Smith’s lectures on rhetoric. He remembered the pleasure Smith said he felt, when 
reading Milton, in knowing that the author laced his shoes with latchets, rather than 
buckled them. So this story clearly appealed to Boswell’s imagination too. 
Smith paid attention to the experience of the audience and what would appeal to 
their imagination. This in turn required the author t  use imagination to understand the 
reader’s perspective. The main focus of rhetoric had previously been either on oratory 
(designed to instruct and persuade), or on style and use of figures of speech. But Smith 
extended the subject to include, not only oratory, but also historical, or narrative, 
discourse, as well as poetic discourse (see Howell 1975). This followed directly from the 
need to justify theories in relation to experience, so communicating theories also in 
relation to narration of experience. Persuasive discourse was thus an important part, but 
not the whole, of Smith’s communicative discourse. 
We can see an illustration of the idea of invoking the sympathy of the audience in 
Hume’s Treatise (1739-40), where he aims to take rationalist argument as far as he can 
(but concludes with skepticism). Near the end of the first Book he states that, after 
grappling with metaphysical problems by means of pure reason: 
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I am confounded with all these questions, and begin to fancy myself in the most 
deplorable condition imaginable, invironed with thed epest darkness, and utterly 
deprived of the use of every member and faculty. 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these 
clouds, nature herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical 
melancholy and delirium, either by relaxing this bent of mind, or by some 
avocation, and lively impression of my senses, which obliterate all these 
chimeras. I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I converse, and am merry with 
my friends; and when after three or four hours’ amusement, I would return to 
these speculations, they appear so cold, and strained, and ridiculous, that I cannot 
find in my heart to enter into them any farther. 
Here then I find myself absolutely and necessarily determined to live, and talk, 
and act like other people in the common affairs of life.  
Hume (1739-40: 269) 
This conjures up a lovely picture of the person the Fr nch referred to as “le bon 
David”, out for an evening’s entertainment in Edinburgh’s Old Town with his friends 
(see further Graham’s, 2004, biography). But it is also persuasive in fostering the view he 
came to about the need to ground metaphysics in real experience which, as we have seen, 
was to prove important for the development of ideas about economics and about rhetoric. 
Smith approached rhetoric as he approached all subjects, attempting to identify a 
system – something which he clearly found appealed to his own imagination (Skinner 
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1996). His system of rhetoric was integral to his philosophy more generally (Berry 1974). 
As Bryce puts it in his Introduction to the L ctures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (Smith 
1762-3: 25), “The primacy he gives to language … rests on his vision of language as the 
embodiment of the mind’s striving towards the ‘metaphysical’, towards 
conceptualization”. One of the students in Smith’s logic class in Glasgow, John Miller, 
put his impressions of the lectures on rhetoric as follows: “the best method of explaining 
and illustrating the various powers of the human mind, the most useful part of 
metaphysics, arises from an examination of the several ways of communicating our 
thoughts by speech, and from an attention to the princi les of those literary compositions, 
which contribute to persuasion and entertainment…” (Royal Society of Edinburgh 1794: 
61-2). In rhetoric, as in other areas, Smith was able to put together new ideas, which were 
being formulated more widely in Scotland in such a new and systematic way that his 
rhetoric was highly persuasive. As Tribe (1999: 618) puts it, “he treated the domain of 
rhetoric as equivalent to human communication, and therefore a pathway to an 
understanding of human motivation”. 
While theories, in the Scottish approach to science, were derived from detailed 
study of experience, the communication of theories did not need to follow the same 
sequence. Indeed Smith argued that presenting theories as being derived from first 
principles was more persuasive than treating each experience in isolation – even if that is 
not how theories are arrived at (Skinner 1996). Smith thus understood well why 
Descartes’s ideas had been so persuasive. Nevertheless, being unpersuaded himself by 
Descartes’s rationalism, Smith regarded Descartes’s physics as “one of the most 
entertaining romances that have ever been wrote” (Smith 1762-63a: 146).  This 
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distinction between how ideas are arrived at and how they are communicated will prove 
to be important for how Smith himself came to be understood.  
 
Rhetoric and Economic Theory 
We can see an example of this disparity between the formation of ideas and their 
communication in Smith’s (1776) most famous work, An Inquiry into the Nature and 
Causes of the Wealth of Nations. One of the principles which Smith had derived from his 
detailed historical study was the principle of the division of labour. Wealth is created as a 
result of specialisation; this was one of the main reasons for arguing for free trade - that it 
allowed for more specialisation and thus higher productivity. But, instead of arriving at 
this conclusion late in the work, Smith started the first chapter with the division of labour, 
as if it were one of Descartes’s axioms. He explained it in terms of an example which 
some regard as apocryphal: the pin factory. This example appeals to our imaginations – 
we can imagine how difficult it would be for each of us to make our own pins, compared 
to a factory, where production is broken down into specialist steps. Further examples are 
given which reinforce our acceptance of the principle. Then the implications of the 
principle of the division of labour are drawn out. 
  I have just referred to Adam Smith’s own communications. But communication of 
ideas was itself seen by Smith and Hume as integral to economic development (Dow and 
Dow 2008).13 Trade itself requires successful communication betwe n buyer and seller – 
there must be some capacity to understand the other’s point of view in order to engage in 
successful trade, even while pursuing self-interest. Further, trade exposes importers to 
new ideas about consumption, which sparks off ideas about possibilities for local 
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production; thus other countries catch up with the first developers. Also the division of 
labour is enhanced by new ideas about developing production techniques which arise 
from communication. Workers learn new practices andforms of self-discipline in the 
workplace through communication (Wennerlind 2006).  
Hume and Smith also studied how communication goes through its own process 
of development as an integral element of social and economic development – the organic 
view of language (Berry 1974). This compounds the difficulty in understanding older 
texts. Smith speaks across the centuries, but is not necessarily understood in the same 
way. Indeed the interpretations of Smith are legion, differing at a range of levels, as 
Samuels (2009) explains with respect to the invisible hand. In the next section we draw 
on our understanding of Smith’s rhetorical theory to help us understand the different 
interpretations of Smith, focusing on the invisible hand, the impartial spectator and the 
theory of economic development. 
 
Modern interpretation of Smith 
Smith is most commonly associated with the concept of the invisible hand, a metaphor, 
which appeals to the imagination, for the apparently spontaneous successful workings of 
free market economies made up of selfish individuals (Tribe 1999). But we only have to 
reflect on the well-known influence of Smith on Marx (a connection emphasised by 
Heilbroner 1986) to appreciate the scope for different readings of Smith, such that we 
cannot reasonably classify him as an out-and-out free marketeer. Indeed the conventional 
understanding in the modern history of economic thoug t literature is that the expression 
above of the invisible hand concept is misleading (see eg Winch 1997). As Evensky 
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(2005: chapter 10) puts it, we can differentiate betwe n the “Chicago Smith” and the 
“Kirkcaldy Smith”. On the one hand, self-interest i now understood to be conditioned by 
moral sentiments rather than being equivalent to selfishness, and on the other hand Smith 
noted the tendency for free competition to be limited. Indeed the one use of the term 
“invisible hand” in the Wealth of Nations (Smith 1776: IV.ii.9) refers to the unintended 
consequences of bias in favour of domestic over foreign direct investment. This is 
intended as an indication of the scope for different interpretations: Samuels demonstrates 
the many and subtle differences in which the invisible hand has been interpreted.  
 Nevertheless the general equilibrium interpretation became embodied in much of 
modern economics, deduced from axioms of selfish ration l individual behaviour (see eg 
Arrow and Hahn 1971). So, arguably, what has happened is that Smith’s rhetoric was 
mistaken for his scientific method. Smith arrived at his (provisional) principles based on 
detailed study of societies, but presented them as if on the basis of established principles 
which could be treated as axioms. Indeed Smith (1762-63a: 146) noted how appealing 
argument from first principles could be, being more persuasive than the Aristotelian style. 
But the distinction between (provisional) principles and axioms had not been successfully 
conveyed. So Smith would in fact have understood why his system was interpreted as 
Cartesian, even if that conflicted with everything else he wrote – about scientific method 
and about human nature. This also meant that his economic theory has been open to the 
interpretation, from a Cartesian perspective, of being the forerunner of general 
equilibrium theory (see Montes 2005).  
However Smith’s system of rhetoric was after all intended as a contribution to 
metaphysics, since communication and persuasion were essential aspects of the 
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production of knowledge which rests on social convention, including conventional belief. 
Because truth was inaccessible, the notion of true axioms was ruled out. So, rather than 
presenting free-market principles as universals, in fact he pointed out ways in which 
market functions might be eroded – by producers trying to limit competition (Smith 
1776: 84, 267), or by workers’ lives being blighted by repetitive tasks (ibid.: 782), for 
example. His conclusions for economic theory and policy were provisional, and open to 
the need for change in different circumstances. Smith was forceful in his rhetoric – he 
was keen to persuade; but this is perfectly compatible with an acceptance that Smith was 
offering theories which were not “true”, and certainly not universally true, even if he 
thought they were the most persuasive according to his wn imagination and experience. 
Smith’s notion of the impartial spectator provides another example of a concept 
which has been the subject of a range of interpretations. For Smith, knowledge was 
founded on sentiment and imagination, as well as experience. A major motivation in the 
eighteenth century for analysing the emerging specialised market economies was the 
concern that they would erode moral values (see eg Hont and Ignatieff, eds, 1983 on the 
Scottish enlightenment, and Young 1997 specifically on Smith). In The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, Smith (1759) explored the intrinsically social aspect of human nature, where 
sympathy plays a crucial role. It is sympathy with an imagined impartial spectator, as 
much as with the opinion of our neighbours, which keeps us in moral check (Raphael 
1985, Griswold 2006). It is now generally agreed among Smith scholars that the self-
interested individual of the Wealth of Nations is consistent with the social being of the 
Moral Sentiments, bound by moral constraints embodied in the imagined judgement of 
the impartial spectator (Winch 1997, McCloskey 2008).  
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This understanding of Smith comes from taking seriously his system of rhetoric, 
and applying it to his own work. What we have now was published posthumously, based 
on students’ notes which only emerged in 1961. Had Smith had more confidence in his 
own thoughts on rhetoric, and his lectures published earlier, then perhaps his own use of 
rhetoric, and its connection with his moral philosophy, would have led to a different 
interpretation of his economics. However it is only recently that economists beyond the 
history of economic thought have extended their attention to The Theory of Moral 
Sentiments, and this has tended to be constrained by considering it in terms of a 
framework which is closer to Cartesian than Smithian. Thus for example Ashraf et al 
(2005) interpret the impartial spectator, not as a ource of moral restraint, but as the 
vehicle for rationality to prevail over sentiment i the long run. Alternatively Binmore 
(2005: 50) provides another interpretation of the impartial spectator as the exogenous 
imposer of some absolute concept of the Good. But Smi h had emphasised in his theory 
of rhetoric the importance of imagination and (moral) sentiment, conditioned by the 
social nature of our understanding (alongside reason), f r the successful communication 
of ideas. Moral judgement is neither reason overcoming sentiment, nor externally 
imposed, but rather the result of “judgement being shaped by the views of others” 
(Broadie 2006: 158). This applies to internal communication with an imagined moral 
arbiter as much as to external communication of a speaker with his audience. 
We might also have had for longer a better understanding of the Scottish 
enlightenment thought on progress, and comparisons between different societies. Scottish 
thought on economic development is often portrayed as a matter of inevitable progress 
from one stage to another. But, when the Scottish thinkers discussed the sequence of 
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stages of social and economic development, it was clear that they did not see it in that 
way. They referred to other societies at earlier stages of economic development, with 
respect, and in fact addressed the problem that moral values might be eroded in later 
stages of development (Meek 1976). This reflected not only the Scottish theory of 
knowledge, but also their sense of “otherness” with respect to other societies in spite of 
the commonalities in human nature. This sense of “otherness” arguably underpinned their 
epistemology (particularly the inaccessibility of absolute truth) and their methodology 
(particularly a focus on the provisionality of princ ples).14 Adam Ferguson (1767), the 
father of modern sociology, was particularly concered that the socio-economic system 
would self-destruct as the social fabric was eroded by increasing commercialisation. He 
was a Highlander and Gaelic speaker who would have been aware even more than his 
Lowland friends of the dangers of making judgements about different social systems as 
indicating savagery.  
 
Conclusion 
If nothing else, the theory of knowledge in the Scottish Enlightenment allowed for 
different approaches to, and versions of, knowledge. Social convention and moral values 
were critical to the successful functioning of society; reason alone was inadequate as a 
basis for improvement. This provided the basis for respect for difference. The system of 
rhetoric provided grounding for successful communication in spite of difference. The 
connection made between communication and understanding could still stand us in good 
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1 This paper has benefited from the comments and suggestions of Deirdre McCloskey and two anonymous 
referees. 
2 For example in Rapin’s (1684) rhetorical study. 
3 This development arose from the work of Boyle (1663), Sprat (1667) and Locke (see Howell 1967). 
4 See further http://deirdremccloskey.org/for references to her other extensive writing in this area. 
5 While Brown (1994: chapter 2) argues that Smith did not address issues of meaning (and thus the scope 
for different meanings) in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, a study of his work as a whole 
provides a better understanding of these issues. 
6 This is the case, even allowing for the increased interest now in his Theory of Moral Sentiments; issues of 
interpretation arise here as with Smith’s economics. 
7 Keynes’s philosophy was significantly influenced by Hume; see Carabelli (1988). 
8 McCloskey (2006) explores the significance of moral sense in Scottish ethical theory, in contrast to Kant 
and Bentham’s inability to explain the motivation behind ethics. 
9 Newton would provide another case study for different interpretations from different epistemological 
perspectives, in this case the perspectives of England and France, compared to Scotland. 
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10 Because (inevitably) partial evidence leaves gaps to be filled by conjectures, this approach is someti s 
referred to as conjectural history. 
11 In translation (by the present author) from Scots: “O would that some Power would give us the gift of 
seeing ourselves as others see us”. 
12 It is Smith’s emphasis on the value of the plain style which Brown (1994) argues suppresses issues of 
meaning, while he in fact employs figures of speech himself in the Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres. 
13 See McCloskey (1994: 77-83); McCloskey and Klamer (1995) and McCloskey (2006: 306-7) for more 
general statements of this argument. 
14 The importance more generally of the sense of otherness has been most fully developed by Kaul (2008, 
chapter 2 and 3). 
